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Institutional  and  organizational  variety  is  increasingly  characterising  advanced 
economic  systems.  While  traditional  economic  theories  have  focussed  almost 
exclusively  on  profit-maximizing  (i.e.  for-profit)  enterprises  and  on  publicly-owned 
organizations, the increasing relevance of non-profit organizations, and especially of 
social  enterprises,  requires  scientists  to  reflect  on  a  new  comprehensive  economic 
approach  for  explaining  this  organizational  variety.  The  paper  examines  the  main 
limitations of the orthodox and institutional theories and comes to assert the need for 
creating and testing a new theoretical framework, which considers the way in which 
diverse  enterprises  pursue  their  goals,  the  diverse  motivations  driving  actors  and 
organizations, and the different learning patterns and routines within organizations. 
The  new  framework  of  analysis  proposed  in  the  paper  draws  upon  recent 
developments  in  the  theories  of  the  firm,  institutional  evolution,  and  motivational 
complexity to explain the presence of diverse types of organizations on a continuum 
ranging  from  purely  for-profit  and  commercial  forms  to  socially-oriented 
entrepreneurial ones. 
 
KEYWORDS: Social enterprises, organizational pluralism, neo-institutional economics, 
behavioral economics, organizational continuum  
                                                 
∗ Carlo Borzaga is Full Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of Trento, Italy, where he teaches Political 
Economics  and  Labour  Economics.  He  is  also  President  of  the  European  Research  Institute  on  Cooperative  and  Social 
Enterprises in Trento. E-mail: carlo.borzaga@euricse.eu  
Sara Depedri is Research Fellow in the Department of Economics at the University of Trento, Italy. She teaches Economics of 
Employment Choices and Workers’ Motivations and Economics of Nonprofit Organizations. E-mail: sara.depedri@unitn.it  
Ermanno Tortia is Researcher in the Department of Economics at the University of Trento, Italy. He teaches Economics of 
Cooperative and Nonprofit Organizations. E-mail: ermanno.tortia@unitn.it    3 
We … have focused too long on one particular model, the profit maximizing firm, and 
in particular a variant of that model, the unfettered market. We have seen that that 
model does not work, and it is clear that we need alternative models. We need also to 
do more to identify the contribution that these alternative forms of organization are 
making to our society, and when I say that, the contribution is not just a contribution 
to GDP, but a contribution to satisfaction. 
Joseph Stiglitz (2009), Nobel Prize for Economics, Columbia 
University. 
 
Dilemmas nested inside dilemmas appear to be able to defeat a 
set of principals attempting to solve collective-action problems 
through the design of new institutions to alter the structure of 
the incentives they face. … But some individuals have created 
institutions, committed themselves to follow rules, and 
monitored their own conformance to their agreements, as well 
as their conformance to the rules in common pool of resources 
situations. 






While  it  always  has,  institutional  and  organizational  variety  is  increasingly 
characterising advanced economic systems. While traditional economic theories have 
focused  almost  exclusively  on  profit-maximizing  (i.e.  for-profit)  enterprises  and 
publicly-owned organizations, it is impossible to deny the importance of a large sector 
which  includes  an  heterogeneous  mix  of  organizational—or  otherwise  associative—
forms, which do indeed play a crucial role in providing many goods and services, in 
supporting  development,  and  in  reducing  poverty  and  marginality.  What  has  been 
sometimes referred to as  the ‘social economy’ and sometimes the ‘third sector’, is a 
variegated set of these types of intermediate organizations. The most traditional and 
widespread  of  these  forms  are  non-profit  organizations  and  cooperative  firms. 
However,  new  arrangements  have  emerged  over  time,  both  within  and  outside  of 
these  traditional  categories.  These  new  organizational  solutions  are  often  grouped 
under the heading of ‘social enterprise’, a new entrepreneurial form combining a social 
aim with business-like management (Borzaga and Defourny, 2001; Anheier and Ben-
Ner, 2003). The interest in social enterprises is firstly explained by the importance 
increasingly  acquired,  in  both  developing  and  developed  countries,  by  non-profit 
organizations and other types of socially-oriented firms delivering, for example, social 
services,  ethical  finance  and  micro-credit,  or  supporting  fair-trade  and  the  work-
integration  of  disadvantaged  people.  Furthermore,  social  enterprises  have  often 
emerged (and are emerging in many countries) through a bottom-up process. Civil 
society  has  directly  responded  to  the  new  needs  of  citizens  by  creating  new 
organizations that are better able to cope with market, contract and state failures in 
the delivery of social and welfare services than more traditional organizational forms 
(i.e. public bodies and for-profit firms). 
   4 
The increasing importance of social enterprises and the interest in both the scientific 
and political domains have recently stimulated various legislative reforms designed to 
recognize these entrepreneurial organizations pursuing a public-benefit aim
1: first of 
which were the UK law on the Community Interest Company of 2005 and the Italian 
law on the  Impresa  Sociale  of  2005.  These  two  laws  define  social  enterprises  as 
socially-  (or  community-)  oriented  entrepreneurial  organizations  producing  public, 
quasi-public, collective and meritorious goods and services, and pursuing social more 
than  private  objectives.  The  organizational  types  contemplated  by  this  general 
definition have spread into different sectors and fields of activity, adopting different 
kinds of ownership and organizational forms. Furthermore, the organizational mission 
of  social  enterprises  explains  why  they  limit  their  profit  aim  and  reduce  private 
appropriation through the accumulation of locked assets directed to the development 
of the production activity. Since their main objective is not private appropriation by 
the controlling stakeholder(s), different objectives defended by different stakeholders 
may  often  be  accommodated  in  the  firm’s  governance.  This  characteristic  also 
explains the diffusion of social enterprises that adopt multi-stakeholder governance 
structures. 
 
While traditional non-profit organizations with mainly advocacy and distributive aims 
are compatible with orthodox economic theories, the emergence and spread of non-
profit organizations with entrepreneurial behaviour—like social enterprises—seems to 
contrast with the predictions of these theories and therefore requires new and more 
convincing explanations. The new theory requires especially to reconsider the specific 
socio-economic  and  historical  characteristics  of  organizations.  Firstly,  in  most 
countries, the public welfare state has been subject to stricter financial constraints 
due to the growing inability of public finance to support it, and to limitations in the 
bureaucratic  procedures  for  welfare  services  delivery.  Furthermore,  the  recent 
international financial crisis has reinforced the idea that the role of both the state and 
the market need radical rethinking because, on the one hand, self-regulated markets 
have been unable to properly predict and counter the massive deficit that has swept 
through financial markets, and, on the other, the state has been forced to commit a 
huge amount of resources to bailing-out nearly bankrupt economies, leaving the social 
entrepreneur as one of the few actors able to take over social and welfare services 
and develop new ones. The study of different ownership and governance forms in the 
theory  of  the  firm  is  again  relevant  because  different  firm  types  can  perform 
differently in crisis situations. Indeed, while many for-profit firms and other investor-
owned organizations have been badly hit by the crisis, third-sector organizations are 
facing the crisis without significant losses, given their lower dependence on financial 
markets.  At  the  same  time  they  are  being  asked  to  help  minimize  the  negative 
consequences of growing unemployment and poverty. Their recent growth contradicts 
the  thesis  that  non-profit  oriented  firms  represent  a  residual  organizational  form 
which will be superseded by the ongoing development and perfection of competitive 
markets (Hansmann, 1996).  
 
Given the current state of economic development, there is a stronger need than in the 
past to invest in the understanding of social enterprises and other associative forms of 
enterprises (Stiglitz, 2009). This process should start with the development of new 
theoretical  insights.  The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  contribute  to  explaining  the 
emergence  and  growth  of  social  enterprises  as  part  of  the  institutional  and 
organizational  variety  that  underpins  the  development  of  contemporary  economic 
                                                 
1  Enterprises  with  clear  social  aims  and  which  produce  services  in  a  stable  manner  initially  took  the  legal  form  of 
cooperatives. Thus they were mainly regulated by cooperatives law (in Italy, Law 381/91 on social cooperatives). The legal 
definition of social enterprises was only later developed.    5 
systems. A new interpretive framework is drawn for better interpretation of the new 
phenomenon. This framework extends beyond traditional approaches, which include 
primarily the neoclassical and new-institutionalist paradigms. It adds insights taken 
mainly from evolutionary and behavioural economics. It shows the importance of the 
institutional  framework  and  motivational  drivers  of  actors  involved  in  non-profit-
oriented  firms  in  influencing  their  ability  to  produce  public  and  quasi-public  and 
private  goods  in  innovative  ways.  This  allows  firm  objectives  to  be  widened  by 
bypassing the exclusive focus on profit maximisation and the dominance of monetary 
incentives in economic behaviour. The various organizational and ownership forms can 
be arranged along a continuum moving from the prevalence of financial and egoistic 
goals to the pursuit of social aims. The continuum ranges from purely for-profit and 
commercial forms to socially-oriented entrepreneurial ones, passing through mutual-
benefit and other types of associative enterprises.  
 
 
2. The state of the art 
 
Traditional  economic  approaches  to  the  variety  of  firms  have  focused  mainly  on 
cooperatives; only recently have they paid some attention to non-profit organizations. 
They have explained the emergence of the various types of organizations mainly in 
terms  of  efficiency,  regarding  them  as  minimizers  of  the  contract  costs  with  their 
various  stakeholders.  Furthermore,  the  literature  on  non-profit-oriented  firms  has 
considered the non-profit constraint to be the crucial institutional device enabling their 
social role. The non-profit constraint allows the organization to overcome market and 
contract  failures,  most  notably  in  the  presence  of  asymmetric  information  and  the 
production of services of a relational nature. Indeed, this constraint helps ensure that 
resources are employed in the interests of stakeholders other than the owners of the 
organization. Moreover, the distribution constraint encourages greater attention to the 
quality of services, limiting the opportunism of organizations and reducing asymmetric 
information  about  quality.  The  overall  advantage  of  the  non-profit  distribution 
constraint  is  that  it  fosters  fiduciary  relationships,  especially  between organizations 
and stakeholders exposed to problems of information asymmetry (Hansmann, 1996). 
 
Following  the  efficiency  approach,  theories  have  emphasized  some  significant 
limitations of cooperative firms and non-profit organizations. Specifically, they identify 
the  main  disadvantages  of  these  organizations  as  reduced  efficiency  and  a  lower 
ability  to  invest  (Ward,  1958;  Furubotn  and  Pejovich,  1970),  and  as  inflated 
governance  and  decision-making  costs  due  to  the  heterogeneity  of  the  interests 
pursued by the membership (Hansmann, 1996). The non-distribution constraint itself 
is  the  source  of some  disadvantages  because  it  restricts  the  opportunity  to  collect 
financial  resources  for  investments.  This  also  implies  that  cooperative  and  social 
enterprises are supposed to be transitional organizations destined to disappear with 
the  completion  of  markets.  The  theories  have  thus  disregarded  the  ability  of 
cooperative  and  social  enterprises  to  control  decision-making  costs  through 
appropriate governance structures and to increase production and social surplus by 
defining  a  mutual  benefit  and  public  benefit  objective  and  by  setting  value  on 
motivational factors not exclusively linked to self-regarding and monetary aims.  
 
Furthermore,  little  attention  has  been  paid  to  the  way  in  which  social  goals  and 
stakeholder involvement interact with the presence of the non-profit constraint so that 
non-profit-oriented  firms  produce  a  higher  social  surplus  which  they  are  able  to 
distribute  more  fairly  than  other  organizational  forms.  In  this  regard,  the  public-
benefit aim, the pro-social motivations of the patrons of the organization, and forms   6 
of governance based on the involvement of all the main stakeholders come to the 
fore. Some recent studies evidence indeed that a specific outcome of the non-profit 
constraint  is  its  ability  to  favour  the  expression  and  the  flourishing  of  intrinsic 
motivations (Valentinov, 2007, 2008).  
 
To identify the way in which non-profit-oriented firms pursue the satisfaction of social 
needs we may consider their advantages in pursuing social goals. Some authors have 
recognized  the  contribution  these  organizations  make  by  increasing  the  supply  of 
goods  or  services  provided,  focusing  on  generating  donations  (Weisbrod  1988)  or 
involving  consumers  (Ben-Ner  and  Van  Hoomissen  1991).  Some  studies  have 
emphasized  the  net  increase  in  employment  generated  by  non-profits  and  the 
opportunities created for people who are difficult to employ. However, both theoretical 
and  empirical  analyses  have  rarely  investigated  the  ability  of  not-for-profits  to 
guarantee  x-efficiency  and  to  gather  resources  other  than  donations,  especially 
through market exchanges. In addition, some empirical studies on specific areas of 
activity have shown that not-for-profits perform better than public agencies and for-
profit firms.
2 Furthermore, researchers have generally not recognized the advantages 
that not-for-profits derive from their ability to manage huma n resources. Instead, 
they have concentrated on the capacity of not -for-profits to identify the demand for 
general-interest services and to provide innovative services to meet social needs. 
  
The  aim  of  the  following  sections  is  to  demonstrate  that  the  ins titutional, 
organizational,  and  motivational  features  of  non -profit-oriented  firms  crucially 
influence their ability to increase the social surplus in terms of increased production of 
public-benefit  services,  and  to  distribute  resources  to  the  less  well -off,  thereby 
reducing poverty and marginality. Purposeful intervention in the solution of social 
problems and the positive effects on employment and output are conjugated with 
unintended positive spillovers in terms of reinforced trust at the local level and  the 
development of networks of co -interested subjects and organizations committed to 
collaborative more than competitive interaction (Borzaga and Becchetti, 2010). 
 
 
3. New approaches to the study of social enterprises 
 
The  limitations  of  existing  theories  of  social  enterprises  require  the  creation  and 
testing of a new theoretical framework that correctly accounts for the entrepreneurial 
and organizational variety of contemporary economies, starting from in-depth analysis 
of the underlying institutional variety. Social enterprises should be contextualised in a 
theory of how these organizations, and productive non-profit firms in general, pursue 
their goals in connection with the underlying organizational processes and proprietary 
form. To this end, they may define an appropriate incentive structure that comprises 
not  only  monetary  incentives  but  also  appropriate  intrinsic,  social  and  relational 
elements (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001). 
 
Consequently, full understanding of social enterprises requires assuming the existence 
of different types of motivations driving actors and organizations, of different learning 
patterns  within  organizations,  and  of  diverse  mixes  of  resources  in  organizations.
3 
More precisely, our framework of analysis draws upon recent developme nts in the 
                                                 
2 See Cutler and Berndt (2001) on the medical care industry and Krueger and Malečkov{ (2003) on education. 
3 The relevance of intrinsic motivations in the social sciences was underlined several decades ago by some of the classic 
works in social psychology, for example Maslow (1954), Deci (1975), and Deci and Ryan (1985). More recently, the debate on 
intrinsic motivations has spread in economic science from the work by Frey (1997), who evidences a possible crowding -out 
effect of intrinsic motivations by extrinsic incentives when the latter are misaligned with self-determined objectives.   7 
theories of the firm, institutional evolution, and motivational complexity to explain the 
crucial changes in ownership rights and governance rules that have been necessary 
both to implement the new entrepreneurial form of the social enterprise and to meet 
the needs and motivations of the actors involved. Analysis of the governance structure 
can yield a better understanding of the different patterns of involvement of different 
stakeholders. However, at the same time, governance structures also reflect different 
aims  and  the  prevalence  of  social  over  financial  and  economic  objectives.  Hence, 
objectives, governance rules and economic aspects should be incorporated into the 
same analytical scheme if proper account is to be given to institutional variety. 
 
As a first step in explaining the economic nature of social enterprises, it is necessary 
to assume that individuals—including entrepreneurs and managers—are characterized 
by  motivational  complexity.  Self-interested  preferences  interact  with  relational, 
procedural, and intrinsic aspects of human behaviour (Ben-Ner and Putterman 1998).  
 
Secondly, a satisfactory theory should overcome the conventional conception of the 
firm, mainly because of both the neoclassical and the neo-institutional assumptions of 
self-interested motivations and profit-maximization, on the one hand, and of the static 
approach to institutional and cultural changes on the other (Borzaga and Tortia 2007). 
Moreover, social enterprises and non-profit organizations are difficult to evaluate in 
terms of the traditional concept of efficiency used in the case of for-profit firms. This is 
because  the  activities  pertaining  to  this  area  of  the  economy  have  non-traditional 
features, such as a high degree of contract incompleteness both on the labour and 
product  markets,  the  delivery  of  services  characterised  by  high  relational  intensity 
(Gui  and  Sugden,  2005),  pronounced  information  asymmetries  (Hansmann,  1996), 
and risks of free-riding linked to the public nature of some of the services provided. 
Non-profit-oriented firms often employ pools of resources that can be characterised as 
common insofar as their uses are rivalrous, but not excludable (Ostrom, 1994). On 
the other hand, the services that they produce are often collective in nature because 
they are excludable but non-rivalrous. For example, the common ownership of assets 
is  widespread  among  social  enterprises  –  both  cooperatives  and  non-profit 
organizations – while many of the services produced are not rivalrous, as in the case 
of  cultural  performances  and  education.  Given  these  peculiarities,  it  is  difficult  to 
connect  the  evaluation  of  the  role  of  these  enterprises  with  simple  accounting 
measures  such  as  profit  or  value  added;  it  is  likely  to  be  linked  to  other,  more 
qualitative variables, such as the quality and effectiveness of the services produced, 
the  intended  and  unintended  social  effects,  and  the  intensity  of  the  motivations 
expressed by the actors involved (Tortia, 2010; Borzaga, Depedri, and Tortia, 2010). 
Therefore, a broader conception of production efficiency is required, which is likely to 
be unconnected or weakly connected with the profit dimension.  
 
In light of these observations, an adequate theoretical account of social enterprises 
requires an innovative conception of the firm in which profit maximization is no longer 
an  essential  condition.  An  alternative  approach  is  to  consider  firms  as  complex 
organizations that must coordinate actors characterised by different motivations in the 
pursuit  of  production  through  the  implementation  of  suitable  proprietary  and 
governance  structures.  According  to  this  approach,  the  economic  and  institutional 
nature of firms does not necessarily entail the private appropriation of net surpluses. 
A  new  account  of  the  firm  can  help  explain  the  existence  of  entrepreneurial 
organizations that conventional economics views as altruistic, but not productive. An 
alternative  approach  should  emphasize  the  impact  of  social  enterprises  on  the 
formation and dissemination of more inclusive governance forms, the valorisation and 
the  spread  of  non-monetary  motivations,  and  a  more  equitable  distribution  of   8 
resources. This linkage between monetary and non-monetary aspects of production is 
made possible by the development of behavioural and evolutionary economics, which 
have recently contributed to greater understanding of the importance and role of non-
investor-owned  organizations.  They  have  introduced  more  realistic  hypotheses  and 
flexible methodologies showing that human behaviour cannot be described solely in 
terms of self-interest (Fehr and Gächter 2000; Fehr and Schmidt 2001). 
 
From an evolutionary and behavioural perspective, firms cannot be conceived as mere 
maximizers of the net returns accruing to their investment programmes and operating 
in  competitive  markets;  rather,  they  must  be  interpreted  as  coordinating  devices 
operating in imperfect economic environments where the production of value added, 
and  not  the  maximization  of  profit,  is  the  best  predictor  of  firm  survival  and 
expansion.  Firms  organize  production  to  satisfy  needs  that  may  be  private  and 
material but also collective, social, relational, and psychological (Dopfer 2005). When 
individual  activities  are  unable  to  achieve  the  expected  results  effectively  or 
efficiently, there evolve organizational routines which allow people to come together 
and  arrange  production  on  a  collective  basis.  The  objective  of  this  process  is  the 
enjoyment  of  the  results  (the  surplus)  deriving  from  the  activity.  But  the  social 
function is the satisfaction of needs, and the enjoyment of the results must involve all 
stakeholders, and not simply the investors. Social goals can be pursued through the 
implementation of specific organizational routines, such as the socialization of a firm’s 
capital and stakeholder involvement in decision making. 
 
Moreover, theoretical and empirical studies on group selection show that altruism and 
pro-social  attitudes  can  help  increase  the  imitative  success  of  individuals, 
organizations,  communities,  and  society  by  boosting  sympathy,  cooperation,  trust, 
and a sense of community (Hodgson 1993; Bowles 2004; Gowdy and Seidl 2004). 
Pro-social attitudes, in their turn, support the production of greater economic surplus 
and social welfare, because they help reduce transaction costs and foster the pursuit 
of common goals. Motivational complexity also encourages the creation of a suitable 
institutional environment in which non-self-regarding motivations interact with self-
interested ones and are supported by conformance to shared rules of behaviour and 
common values (Grimalda and Sacconi 2005; Sacchetti and Sugden, 2009). Relational 
and other-regarding preferences, together with an interest in fair procedures, play a 
crucial role in advancing the well-being of the actors involved (Helliwell and Huang 
2005;  Tortia  2008).  They  can  be  considered  a  non-monetary  part  of  the  mix  of 
incentives offered by the organization (Bacchiega and Borzaga, 2001-2003). On the 
one  hand,  incentives  need  to  be  functional  and  effective  for  the  pursuit  of  the 
organization’s objectives; while, on the other hand, they must also match individual 
motivations  as  closely  as  possible.  The  incentive  structure  is  implemented  through 
governance and other working rules and may comprise different incentives to different 
degrees.  In  this  context,  we  expect  to  observe  that  different  incentive  mixes  are 
better able to foster the objectives of different organizational and ownership forms. 
Monetary incentives are not necessarily the most effective ones in all situations. On 
the  contrary,  where  the  stress  is  placed  on  mutual-benefit  and  social  objectives, 
monetary  incentives  can  be  expected  to  be  relatively  less  effective,  while  the 
flourishing  of  intrinsic  motivations,  reciprocity  among  co-involved  actors,  and  the 
sharing of common rules and values are more likely to lead to increased efficiency and 
effectiveness in production. 
 
Finally, economic and monetary objectives should cohere with the relational and social 
aspects of firm operation. Substitution between the two aspects (monetary and non-
monetary)  is  possible  but  only  to  a  limited  extent.  For  example,  in  the  case  of   9 
employed  workers,  higher  wages  can  purchase  their  acceptance  of  an  unpleasant 
work environment to only a limited extent; and this is an inefficient solution insofar as 
costs are increased. Voluntary work is an exception to the rule of the substitutability 
of  monetary  and  non-monetary  incentives  because,  in  this  case,  the  relevance  of 
monetary incentives tends to be excluded entirely. Indeed, a motivational continuum 
can  be  envisaged  where,  at  the  one  extreme,  monetary  incentives  predominate 
irrespective of the importance of non-monetary aspects, while at the other extreme, 
volunteer work stresses intrinsic aspects alone. 
 
 
4. An interpretive model of social enterprises 
 
The main assumption behind our new model is that enterprises, far from being profit 
maximizers, are devices coordinating collective economic activities affected through 
the  implementation  of  organizational  routines,  control  rights,  and  governance 
structures  which  serve  to  satisfy  individual  or  collective  needs.  Consequently,  all 
enterprises  must  fulfil  two  conditions:  they  must  satisfy  a  social  need,  and  their 
activity  must  be  economically  sustainable.  Needs  can  be  private  or  collective,  and 
their satisfaction requires the setting up of an appropriate production process to which 
the  implementation  of  governance  and  organizational  routines  is  functional.  The 
function of needs satisfaction ranges from simple satisfaction of a market demand for 
goods and services
4 –  which is the production of a good or service that someone is 
willing to buy – to an exclusive stress on the satisfaction of social needs. Economic 
and financial sustainability is imposed by the necessity to reproduce the production 
process so that it can survive and expand in a context of scarcity and competition. 
The  need  to  accomplish  economic  and  financial  sustainability  is  by  no  means 
equivalent to profit maximisation, for at least two basic reasons. The first is that firms 
must survive for long periods of time even if their behaviour is not directed to the 
maximisation of net surpluses. This behaviour is similar to that of profit-maximising 
firms  in  contexts  of  perfect  competition,  but  it  can  be  markedly  different  when 
imperfect competition prevails. The second reason is that profit maximisation, above 
all  when  it  is  performed  in  a  short-term  perspective,  may  deplete,  instead  of 
strengthen, the firm’s survival potential, for example because it damages reputation 
and trust relations with customers, or because it favours short-term objectives instead 
of long-term ones. In our framework, economic and financial objectives range from an 
exclusive  focus  on  financial  and  economic  aspects  –  the  core  concern  of  profit-
maximizing firms – to the consideration of economic and financial objectives as simple 
constraints that need to be fulfilled if the firm is to survive. This implies that, when an 
organization’s main objective is not private appropriation, breaking-even more than 
profit maximisation is the relevant benchmark for the evaluation of entrepreneurial 
activities. Efficiency can be guaranteed anyway by market competition, public support, 
and the presence of proper motivational drives.  
 
The two conditions represented by financial sustainability and the satisfaction of needs 
are combined and fulfilled to varying extents by different types of enterprise. It is thus 
possible to define a continuum of organizational behaviours and objectives (Bonatti et 
al.  2001).  At  one  extreme  of  this  continuum,  economic  and  financial  objectives 
predominate, and the social aim is simply a constraint. At the other extreme, public-
benefit social objectives predominate, and the financial aim is only a constraint. The 
scheme presented in Figure 1 summarizes the approach. 
                                                 
4 When priority is given to the sale of goods and services over need satisfaction, preferences can be manipulated and result in 
the over-consumption of useless goods, often in conjunction with excessive expenditure on marketing and advertisement.    10 
 
The  left-hand  extreme  of  the  continuum  is  the  classic  model  of  the  for-profit  firm 
presented  in  microeconomic  textbooks,  and  it  is  the  only  one  studied  in  depth  by 
economists to date. Yet it represents only one possible rationale for the creation of 
entrepreneurial ventures, and it does not necessarily apply to all enterprises. When 
economic and financial objectives predominate, we observe processes that are best 
expressed  by  the  functioning  of  regulated  financial  markets  that  publicly  price  the 
value of firms on the basis of expected future returns.
5 Indeed, the same principle is 
often dominant in non -publicly-quoted enterprises, where the pursuit of economic 
objectives is a necessary condition for the sale of the firm at the highest possible 
price.  
 







The opposite extreme of the continuum is exemplified by those social enterprises that 
can  be  defined  as  ‘pure’  in  that  their  activity  is  entirely  devoted  to  public-benefit 
objectives,  while  financial  and  economic  equilibrium  is  merely  instrumental  to  this 
end. If the social aim strictly dominates, organizations do not sufficiently consider the 
financial constraints to their long-term existence and consequently only the financial 
support  of private  donors or other  organizations  (e.g.,  public  administrations)  may 
guarantee  their  survival.  In  other  cases,  however,  social  enterprises  pursue  the 
benefit  of  the  community  at  large  or  of  a  specific  group  of  clients  (mostly 
disadvantaged  people  or  people  in  need  in  general)  but  also  undertake  market 
activities  with  other  parties  and  clients.  Consequently,  the  financial  constraint 
becomes a way for them to guarantee their long-term efficiency and does not conflict 
with the non-profit nature of the firm. Profits are in fact accumulated to asset lock for 
future members and clients (with an intergenerational social benefit).  
 
A  wide  variety  of  intermediate  firm  types  exist  between  the  two  extremes  of  the 
continuum. The most common of these intermediate types are cooperatives,  which 
are explicitly mutual-benefit organizations, since their primary objective is to satisfy 
the needs of a group of members that control the organization by virtue of individual 
rights,  not  ownership  of  capital  shares.  Within  cooperatives,  the  private  benefit  of 
investors is not predominant; nor is enhanced social well-being the main aim of the 
organization. However, the objectives of cooperatives may be monetary, as when they 
pursue  maximisation  of  their  members’  incomes;  but  their  objectives  may  also  be 
non-monetary  in  nature  and  concern  their  members’  needs.  For  example,  worker 
                                                 
5 However, recent financial crises demonstrate that the process of pricing stocks in financial markets is subject to severe 
imperfections  leading  to  anomalous  fluctuations  and  speculative  movements  in  stock  prices,  which  can  become  weakly 
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cooperatives may be created to guarantee the employment stability of their members, 
consumer cooperatives to guarantee better quality products, and credit cooperatives 
to guarantee access to credit for small producers. The high degree of membership 
involvement and a commitment to mutualism has a range of collective implications, 
such as the sharing of democratic rules and reciprocal aid. When economic objectives 
are predominant, cooperatives come closer to for-profit firms and usually pursue the 
maximization of per-member income (as Ward assumed in 1958). Conversely, when 
they do not distribute positive residuals to their members and use them to expand 
their  activities,  socialize  resources  through  the  asset  lock,  and  pursue  goals  wider 
than purely mutualistic ones, they come closer to social enterprises. This is especially 
the case of social cooperatives.  
 
The heterogeneous aims of organizations also generate diverse characteristics in their 
governance  and  management  structures. Specifically,  the  prevalence  of  social  over 
self-interested  aims  explains  why  cooperatives  and  social  enterprises  exhibit 
distinctive  control  and  governance  mechanisms  characterised  by  democracy  and 
fairness  of  treatment.  Furthermore,  social  goals  also  include  the  well-being  of 
employees and require all stakeholders to share the organizational mission. This inter-
relation with stakeholders explains the endeavour to involve people by implementing 
different  incentive  mixes.  While  incentives  and  exchanges  with  the  stakeholders 
(mainly  employees)  are  more  informed  by  monetary  incentives  in  the  case  of  for-
profit firms, in that of cooperative and social enterprises they are characterised by a 
higher  degree  of  involvement  and  an  emphasis  on  fostering  intrinsic  motivations. 
Inclusion and the sharing of common procedures may be juxtaposed with hierarchy, 
control,  and  the  use  of  powerful  monetary  incentives  as  coordination  mechanisms. 
Moving  rightwards  along  the  continuum,  the  relevance  of  monetary  incentives 
progressively  weakens  as  they  become  mere  instruments  in  the  pursuit  of  social 
goals, while the intrinsic and pro-social motivations increase in importance.  
 
It can therefore be concluded that, for all the types considered, and especially social 
enterprises, organizational objectives and control rights condition the features of the 
production  process:  for  example,  they  may  influence  how  information  circulates, 
knowledge is created and used, and competences and human capital are accumulated 
and retained (Hodgson, 1998). In social enterprises, reduced hierarchy and control 
favour  the  circulation  of  information  that  sustains  the  creation  and  spread  of  non-
codified and tacit knowledge. This system of knowledge production is supported by 
the development of more informal and horizontal models of governance where trust 
and  personal  interaction  play  a  more  fundamental  role  than  they  do  in  other 
organizational  forms  (Frey  and  Osterloh  1999).  For  example,  inclusive  and 
participatory governance can help the organization attract and retain its management 
and workforce without making intensive recourse to career advancement and wage 
increases, but rather by valorising non-monetary motivations and pro-social attitudes. 
In for-profit firms, rather, the dominance of financial objectives and the hierarchy of 
organizational  objectives  relative  to  the  objectives  of  non-controlling  stakeholders 
tend to support the development of formalised procedures and codified knowledge.  
 
 
5. Implications of the model 
 
The approach proposed highlights that the close interconnection between institutional 
and motivational factors is the basis of organizational behaviour. On the one hand, 
different  organizational  and  ownership  forms  favour  the  emergence,  strengthening, 
and enforcement of different kinds of behaviour inside the organization. In this sense,   12 
preferences  are  endogenous  (Bowles  1998,  2004),  because  institutions  are  able  to 
influence  the  behaviour  of  economic  agents  through  a  process  of  downward 
reconstructive causation (Hodgson 2006). The process of preference evolution occurs 
as the actors inside the organizational structure modify their initial propensities and 
behaviours  over  time.  For  example,  the  non-profit  distribution  constraint,  inclusive 
governance,  and  the  social  objectives  of  social  enterprises  are  likely  to  favour  the 
creation of trust relations and horizontal control, whereas they limit the effectiveness 
of traditional governance schemes mainly based on economic incentives, hierarchy, 
and control. Intrinsic motivations, trust, and horizontal coordination can be sufficient 
to guarantee an adequate degree of efficiency even when monetary incentives and 
control  are  weak.  Indeed,  organizational  models  able  to  implement  non-monetary 
incentive schemes based on trust and personal knowledge can result in increased x-
efficiency due to a reduction of agency costs and the creation of new, non-codified 
knowledge.  
 
Conversely,  economic  actors  do  not  join  organizations  as  tabulae  rasae,  devoid  of 
motivational content and complexity. Clearly, people self-select into different types of 
organizations  according  to  the  idiosyncratic  features  of  their  motivational  drives. 
Hence the organization needs to devise proper ways to interact with the motivational 
complexity  that  characterises  economic  actors.  The  implementation  of  a  proper 
incentive  mix  is  crucial  in  this  regard  because  all  the  relevant  motivational  factors 
need to be taken into account (Borzaga and Mittone, 1997). The organization’s ability 
to  combine  monetary  incentives  with  other  organizational  variables,  such  as  the 
transparency of procedures (Tayler and Blader, 2000), may prove to be one of the 
main  factors  favouring  survival  and  driving  expansion.  Empirically,  it  is  clear  that 
processes  of  self-selection  are  present  in  all  entrepreneurial  types.  However,  they 
become  strikingly  evident  in  the  case  of  social  enterprises  and  cooperative  firms. 
People  motivated  mainly  by  economic  and  monetary  rewards  are  likely  to  eschew 
employment  in  enterprises  with  social  goals  as  they  become  dissatisfied  with 
inadequate  monetary  incentives  and  career  prospects.  On  the  other  hand,  people 
motivated by intrinsic, relational, and other-regarding preferences will tend to choose 
organizations  that  have  social  objectives.  Social  enterprises  become  collectors  of 
intrinsically  motivated  workers.  Their  organizational  processes  can  favour  the 
regeneration and  spread  of motivations  of  this  kind  also  outside  the organizational 
boundaries. 
 
The proposed framework can thus be interpreted in two different ways: institutions 
shape individual behaviour, while individuals driven by different motivations self-select 
into  different  types  of  organizations.  The  former  case  can  be  interpreted  as  the 
process  along  which  different  types  of  organizations  emerge  according  to  the 
behavioural variety already existing in the system. The distribution and heterogeneity 
of the organizational forms provide a good approximation of the prevailing attitudes 
driving the economic agents. This is so because of the top-down process of downward 
reconstructive  causation  envisaged  by  the  evolutionary  approach  (Hodgson  2006): 
existing institutions influence and constrain individual preferences and choices. In the 
latter  case,  actors  driven  by  different  motivations  flow  into  different  organizational 
forms. This process can also encompass modifications in the institutional architecture 
of firms due to the influence of the motivational drives, needs, and demands of actors 
as  they  strive  to modify  organizational  processes  in ways  that  fit better with their 
desired outcomes, in both private and social terms. 
 
While  the  framework  can  account  for  general  trends  in  the  various  organizational 
types,  specific  organizations  can  move  nearer  to,  or  even  cross  over  into,  other   13 
organizational types. Various factors can cause horizontal movements. For example, 
by adopting criteria of corporate social responsibility such as self-regulation, ethical 
codes, or social accounting, for-profit firms can move rightwards by improving their 
social  standing.  The  literature  on  corporate  social  responsibility  (Freeman,  1991; 
Sacconi,  2007)  has  evidenced  important  development  potential  in  this  direction, 
though  private  appropriation  is  still  unavoidably  the  main  aim  of  for-profit  firms. 
Similarly, for-profit entrepreneurs that place greater importance on the nature of the 
goods and services produced rather than on purely financial objectives can push their 
organizations  rightwards.  By  contrast,  social  enterprises  are  usually  located  at  the 
right-hand extreme of the continuum owing to their statutory choice of public-benefit 
aims;  but  the  intensive  development  of commercial  activities  and  use  of monetary 
incentives  may  push  them  leftwards.  As  Figure  1  illustrates,  cooperatives  are 
positioned between the two extremes, but changes in the external environment (i.e., 
market competition) and in their ownership, control, and governance rules may move 
them closer to either the for-profit or the social enterprise poles. They can move in 
both directions when either private-benefit or social objectives are reinforced. 
 
The position of different organizational forms can shift along the continuum over time 
because of reforms of the legal system, other contextual changes, or more general 
cultural  trends.  For  example,  during  the  1980s  and  1990s  cooperatives  in  most 
European  countries  underwent  a  process  of  financial  evolution  that  led  to  the 
introduction  of  new  instruments,  such  as  cooperative  shares  and  bonds,  which 
brought their behaviour nearer to investor-owned firms on the left-hand side of the 
continuum.
6  Starting from these reforms and cultural trends, cooperatives have in 
some periods become organizations maximizing the returns on the investments made 
by members, with weak reference to the social nature of  their institutional set-up. 
However,  in  the  1990s  other  reforms  and  regulatory  decisions  tended  to  push 
cooperative  firms  in  the  opposite  direction,  towards  increased  attention  to  social 
problems. Cases in point are the introduction of laws instituting so cial cooperatives 
(first in Italy in 1991
7 and later in many other countries
8) and in 1995 the adoption of 
the seventh principle of the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), which requires 
cooperatives to contribute to the development of the communitie s in which they 
operate. 
 
The  continuum  in  this  framework  may  have  gaps  where  no  organizational  form 
currently exists. In such cases, new ventures may emerge to fill  a particular gap. This 
phenomenon has been observed many times in the past; for example, the creation of 
cooperative and social enterprises has compensated for shortfalls in the public and 
for-profit supply of goods or services caused by the concentration of power in the 
market or the government’s inability to intervene in the production of specific public 
goods.  When  the  most  suitable  organizational  form  is  absent  in  a  specific  national 
context, the existing forms can compensate for this void. However, the compensation 
can  never  be  complete  because  of  the  shortcomings  caused  by  an  unsuitable  and 
maladapted institutional frame. For-profit firms inevitably under-provide public goods, 
while standard non-profits would not represent the most efficient organizational form 
for producing standardised industrial goods. By the same token, the creation of social 
cooperatives and enterprises is a case in point related to the introduction of a new 
organizational  form  that  has  increased  the  supply  of  public  services  and  reduced 
                                                 
6 In Italy, cooperative shares without voting rights and financial members with minority voting rights were introduced by 
Law no. 59 in 1992. 
7 Law no. 381/1991 on the Impresa Sociale. 
8 By 2009, at least fourteen European and North American countries have approved laws on social cooperatives, as have 
Japan and South Korea.   14 
poverty  and  marginality.  Other  examples  involve  the  social  nature  of  goods  and 
services, as in the case of micro-credit, ethical finance, and fair trade. The process of 
establishing entrepreneurial ventures with a social character has been reinforced by 
the legal recognition of the communitarian role of enterprises in some countries. 
  
A  general  consequence  of  these  processes  is  that  all  organizational  and  ownership 
types  tend,  with  time,  to  shift  rightwards  on  the  continuum  because  of  the  stress 
placed  by  the  new  laws  on  the  public-benefit  objectives  of  social  enterprises.  The 
introduction of a suitable legal framework may persuade many companies, including 
some that are investor-owned, either to assume the new legal status or to imitate 
non-profit  oriented  firms  by  pursuing  private  goals  less  intensively  than  they 
otherwise might do. Legal reforms and cultural change are the basic drivers of a re-
orientation in the objectives of a growing share of productive activities.  
 
Moreover,  the  complex  picture  that  emerges  can  be  interpreted  in  terms  of 
institutional complementarities (Pagano 1992; Aoki 2001; Gagliardi 2008). Different 
institutions  can  be  complementary  because  the  presence  or  effectiveness  of  one 
mechanism  is  reinforced  either  directly  or  indirectly  by  the  presence  of  other 
arrangements denoting the same or an embedding institutional domain. In the case of 
social  enterprises,  institutional  complementarity  refers  to  the  relationship  among 
different coordination mechanisms, since these can be functional to the growth of for-
profit firms by supplying collective services or by improving their social standing. At 
the same time, however, social enterprises are not likely to be a viable organizational 
form for the conduct of traditional commercial activities and the production of private 
goods, which they will therefore buy from for-profit firms.  
 
 
6. Advantages of social enterprises and implications for the social wellbeing 
 
The  described  characteristics  of  the  diverse  types  of  firms  also  helps  explain  their 
different levels of efficiency and effectiveness. As asserted when criticising the simple 
assumption of the orthodox theory, efficiency must not be only interpreted in terms of 
costs  minimization,  for  it  is  the  comprehensive  result  of  an  input-output  efficiency 
problem.  On the  other hand,  organizations  pursuing  social aims  can  be  defined as 
efficient  when  they  achieve  their  main goal:  the  maximization of the  stakeholders’ 
well-being, and therefore the effectiveness of their activities is also measured in terms 
of  quality  achieved.  This  approach  to  the  evaluation  of  the  implications  of 
organizational  activity  affords  a  better  understanding  of  the  efficiency  of  the 
complementarity  among  institutions  and  the  possible  advantages  of  enterprises  of 
different types; advantages which also explain the economic pluralism on the market 
and the non-emergence over time of a unique efficient solution to the production of 
goods and services. 
 
By specifically analysing social enterprises, we have claimed in the previous sections 
that the social aim supports the consistency of a mix of incentives which are a focus 
for the organization’s stakeholders and involve most of them in the governance. This 
implies  that  social  enterprises  are  more  closely  embedded  in  the  local  community, 
enhance  cooperative  behaviours  among  stakeholders,  and  enjoy  higher  trust  and 
reputation  in  the  community.  For  example,  in  the  vast  majority  of  cases  they  are 
created and governed by local actors, who develop and utilize local knowledge and 
resources  with  a  personal  and  relational  character.  These  traits  are  particularly 
important in at least three ways: in the achievement of the organizational goal, in the   15 
production  of  externalities  and  enlarged  well-being,  and  in  the  strictly  economic 
efficiency of the organization.  
 
As regards organizational goals, a governance structure consistent with the social aim 
of  social  enterprises  facilitates  the  provision  of  community  services,  since  the 
memberships  of  social  enterprises  aim  to  satisfy  localized  needs,  which  have 
idiosyncratic features linked to a specific community and may not be satisfied in the 
same way in other contexts. Hence, for example, where the negative effects of de-
industrialization,  such  as  alcoholism  and  unemployment,  spread  in  particular 
communities,  social  services  are  best  delivered  by  those  who  have  deep  personal 
knowledge  of  the  people  affected  and  a  local  understanding  of  the  issues  and 
resources.  By  enhancing  the  well-being  of  marginal  classes  of  citizens,  social 
enterprises reduce negative spillovers. Negative social effects linked to poverty and 
marginality  can  be  mitigated  by  the  ability  of  social  enterprises  to  solve  social 
dilemmas within their boundaries without resorting to imperfect and often unusable 
contractual  relations,  which  would  inflate  transaction  costs,  limit  the  circulation  of 
information,  and  exacerbate  contrasting  interests.  Inclusive  and  multi-stakeholder 
governance  serves  the  purpose  of  coordinating  the  various  participants  in  solving 
social dilemmas. This is possible when the motivations of the actors involved interact 
proactively  with  the  public-benefit  objectives  (Borzaga  and  Tortia,  2009).  Multi-
stakeholder membership and participation is part of the process of developing strong 
personal and local ties, since common aims are shared more than is typical of other 
organizational types. Furthermore, the governance structure and social aim guarantee 
better alignment of services and clients’ needs, as well as prevent the inefficiencies of 
other  organizational  types,  especially  public  agencies,  because  they  are  less 
bureaucratic and more flexible. 
 
A  second  implication  for  social  enterprises  is  that  their  distinctive  features 
(governance structure, embeddedness in the local community, enjoyment of trust and 
reputation) increase the welfare effects of the productive activity. The allocative and 
distributive  mechanisms  of  social  enterprises  are  unique  and  well-adapted  to 
increasing  the  production  of  socially  beneficial  goods  and  reducing  poverty  (Tortia, 
2010). Specifically, it is possible to claim that social enterprises perform an important 
distributive  function,  i.e.,  they  often  supply  free  services  to  people  in  need. 
Specifically,  social  enterprises  introduce  a  new  main  allocation  mechanism  by 
distributing resources without the equivalent of the equilibrium price. The pursuit of 
social aims may require the delivery of goods and services to persons unable to pay 
for them, as in the case of meritorious goods; while when break-even is not possible 
with homogeneous prices, social enterprises can rely on the trust and altruism of their 
clients  for  acceptance  of  price  discrimination.  These  mechanisms  of  allocation  are 
consistent with a distributive function of social enterprises.  
 
Moreover, social enterprises seem to produce higher levels of positive externalities at 
the  local  level.  They  increase  local  well-being,  enhance  the  production  of  social 
capital,  and  enable  the  distribution  of  resources  in  favour  of  people  in  need.  As 
regards local economic development, social enterprises help increase the employment 
level by also offering work opportunities to those who are disadvantaged in the labour 
market. Regarding social capital, social enterprises increase voluntary work, enhance 
the diffusion of knowledge and social norms within the community, diffuse trust and 
cooperation, and increase relationships and social cohesion. Finally, the competitive 
advantage  enjoyed  by  social  cooperatives  in  supporting  these  diverse  functions 
derives  in  part  from  their  ability  to  cover  their  costs  with  alternative  sources  of   16 
financing,  such  as  voluntary  work,  donations,  and  also  a  higher  level  of  non-
remunerated effort on the part of workers.  
 
The features of social enterprises also allow them to generate stronger relationships 
with external actors and to play a specific role in local development and local welfare 
systems, made possible by personal ties with public authorities, other firms, and civil 
society  organizations.  Relationships  with  the  local  community  strengthen  fairness 
principles, collective actions, and altruistic behaviour. At the same time, networking 
relationships  and  external  ties  can  influence  the  internal  equilibrium  of  the 
organization,  because  internal  norms  develop  in  connection  with  the  social  values 
prevalent  in  the  community  of  reference.  Furthermore,  deviant  behaviour  can  be 
sanctioned materially and normatively not only by the organization but also by other 
stakeholders; and it is also reduced by networking relationships among constituent 
firms  and  with  external  actors.  Therefore,  adherence  to  general  community  ideals 
influences the social norms within the network and the behaviour of all parties.  
 
Moreover, a third important implication is that the nature and characteristics of social 
enterprises make it possible to reduce transaction costs with internal agents (Depedri, 
2010).  In  general,  they  increase  non-self-interested  behaviours  and  cooperation 
among  peer  members,  as  well  as  the  sharing  of  rules  and  sanctions,  which  are 
fundamental  ingredients  in  the  ability  to  manage  common  resources  in  a  self-
organized  way  (Ostrom,  1994)  and  to  pursue  collective  objectives  without  the 
intervention  of  external  decision-makers.  Firstly,  the  strength  of  the  relationships 
among their stakeholders brings social enterprises several direct advantages in the 
management  of  exchanges  with  their  constituent  parties.  The  self-regarding 
preferences  and  opportunistic  behaviour  which  usually  hamper  organizational 
performance  and  the  achievement  of  the  organization’s  goals  tend  instead  to  be 
reduced  in  social  enterprises  through  the  implementation  of  self-managed 
organizational processes. The reduction of opportunistic behaviour and the sharing of 
the organization’s goals are particularly important in the management of employees. 
Several  studies  have  shown  that  three  main  features  distinguish  social-aim 
organizations  (in  the  literature  mainly  non-profit  organizations)  from  other 
organizational  types:  the  ability  to  select  altruistic  and  intrinsically  motivated 
employees; the provision of incentives different from standard economic rewards; and 
the presence of managers who internalize the social aim of the organization (Leete 
2000;  Borzaga  and  Depedri  2005;  Benz  2005).  The  behavioural  approach  to 
organizations  presented  in  the  previous  sections  can  also  be  applied  to  human 
resources, because intrinsic motivations and social preferences (altruism, reciprocity, 
donation) among employees increase the level of cooperation, peer monitoring, the 
quality of relationships, and finally performance. In order to attract people who are 
intrinsically  motivated  and  interested  in  the  social  dimension  of  the  job,  social 
enterprises firstly tend to offer wages lower than the market level, which therefore 
exclude  applications  from  indifferent  employees  and  managers  and  only  attract 
dedicated  people  (Handy  and  Katz  1998).  Secondly,  the  characteristics  of  the  job 
(mainly  its  social  usefulness)  and  human  resources  management  practices  (mainly 
focused  on  autonomy,  personal  growth,  social  support,  fairness)  create  a  mix  of 
incentives  that  attract  employees  particularly  interested  in  such  dimensions  of  the 
work.  While  monetary  remuneration  works  only  as  a  threshold  that  can  induce 
workers to accept or refuse employment (Borzaga and Depedri 2005), the greatest 
influence  on  effort  and  satisfaction  is  exerted  by  non-monetary  incentives  like 
participation  in  decision-making  (Michie  and  Sheehan  1999),  low  stress,  perceived 
autonomy, and creativity (Mirvis and Hackett 1983). The importance of these process-
regarding factors is supported by the governance and organizational system of social   17 
enterprises.  Finally,  the  working  environment  (relationships  with  colleagues  and 
internal  social  norms), other employees  (mainly  intrinsically  motivated  people)  and 
managers  (especially  attentive  to  employee  involvement,  fairness,  democracy,  and 
communication)  improve the ‘sense of group’ linked to the social dimension of the 
activity,  and  they  internalize  the  organization’s  mission  in  a  process  of  integrated 
regulation  (Gagnè  and  Deci,  1998).  The  advantage  for  employees  is  high  job 
satisfaction (e.g. Borzaga and Depedri, 2009). The advantages for social enterprises 
are a reduction in the costs of control and in the turnover of employees (e.g., Almond 
and  Kendall  2001;  Borzaga  and  Tortia,  2006)  and  an  increase  in  performance, 
because employees develop closer relations and enhance the quality of the services 
provided, but they also donate part of their effort (e.g. Preston 1989). 
 
Thanks to better relations with clients and the ability to collect higher resources from 
donors and volunteers, and also thanks to improved management of the workforce, 
the entrepreneurial aspect of social enterprises is designed to encourage innovation in 
the  organizational  and  production domains  in terms  of both  new  services  and  new 
organizational  solutions.  Furthermore,  differences  in  the  inputs  used  and  in  the 
outcomes achieved support the efficiency of organizations, and hence the ability to 
respect the financial constraint and pursue the long-run existence of the organization. 
Three main factors specifically increase output. First, the services produced by social 
enterprises tend to be more flexible and innovative, and they can satisfy a greater 
number of clients and a larger proportion of local needs. Second, the employees of 
social enterprises make more effort and ensure the stability of production, despite the 
lower wages that they are often paid. Third, the mobilization of local resources and 
the transmission of social norms to the community (specifically to agents belonging to 
the  community)  create  a  virtuous  circle:  it  enlarges  relationships,  increases 
cooperation and trust, diffuses knowledge and ideals, and reduces the opportunism of 
the people involved. Specific to inputs,  social enterprises seem to have four main 
advantages  in  achieving  savings  by  reducing  costs.  First,  they  benefit  from  free 
resources  and  enjoy  advantages  in  collecting  financial  resources  in  the  market. 
Second,  social  enterprises  enjoy  lower  transaction  costs  (e.g.  in  the  collection  and 
transmission  of  information)  and  less  wastage  of  resources  (e.g.  because  of  less 
bureaucracy and greater flexibility). Third, they incur lower costs also in controlling 
the performance of managers and employees by utilizing mechanisms of control and 
punishment  that  are  different  from  those  of  used  in  other  organizational  types. 
Fourth,  their  mix  of  incentives  provided  to  employees  is  less  costly  than  for  other 
organizational  types.  Efficiency  seems  therefore  theoretically  sustainable  for  social 
enterprises in an input-saving and output-increasing analysis. 
 
A  final  conclusion  concerns  the  evolutionary  approach  to  social  enterprises.  The 
economic  analysis  of  the  processes  that  steer  the  formation  and  dissemination  of 
social enterprises and of their networks is important for understanding the feedback 
loop of cumulative causation that extends from the establishment of social enterprises 
to their spread throughout the system at large because their organizational routines 
need to satisfy economic sustainability in the medium and long run. Given their social 
orientation  and  their  self-organized  nature  based  on  the  spontaneous  initiative  of 
private  citizens  in  the  absence  of  monetary  incentives,  social  enterprises  usually 
undergo intense adaptation of their internal equilibria, establishing new governance 
solutions  and  allocative  mechanisms  (Tortia,  2010).  When  new  solutions  prove 
feasible and sustainable, they are reinforced and they tend to spread by imitation. The 
recent  growth  of  organizational  forms  with  a  social  character—not  necessarily  in 
contexts  where  specific  legislation  exists—demonstrates  the  viability  of  this 
evolutionary pattern. The theoretical framework developed in this study suggests that   18 
social enterprises may increase their weight in contemporary economies, not only in 
the  production of social  and  welfare  services,  but  also  in the  production of private 
goods,  as  often  happens  in  the  case  of  cooperative  firms.  The  above-described 
continuum is also important because these different kinds of firms pursue different 
goals,  exhibit  different  institutional  features,  and  develop  different  competitive 
abilities.  Different  types  of  organizations  will  emphasise  different  abilities  and/or 
limitations,  supporting  institutional  and  organizational  diversity  at  the  macro  level. 
They are likely to achieve efficiency by following different organizational routes, ones 
which  are  more  oriented  to  hierarchy,  control  and  monetary  incentives  when  their 
goals  are  private  and  monetary,  while  inclusion  and  non-monetary  incentives  will 
prevail in the case of mutual-benefit and social orientation. 
 
 
7. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
The  study  of  social  enterprises  is  relatively  new  in  the  social  sciences,  although 
various  strands  of  theoretical  inquiry  have  already  attempted  in-depth  analysis  of 
entrepreneurial  non-profit  organizations  and  cooperative  firms  (Weisbrod,  1977, 
1988;  Hansmann,  1996),  which  exhibit  many  features  in  common  with  social 
enterprises.  Definition  of  a  coherent  scheme  for  the  correct  interpretation  of  the 
working mechanisms and behavioural responses of social enterprises is under way, 
but with both methodological and conceptual difficulties. Many scientific and political 
approaches  in  fact  deny  social  enterprises  their  entrepreneurial  nature,  their 
autonomy, and their ability to survive in the long run. This study has been an initial 
attempt to devise a new framework of analysis by using tools from evolutionary and 
behavioural economics and by conducting more in-depth analysis of the institutional 
features  of  social  enterprises.  Furthermore,  it  has  explained  certain  competitive 
advantages of social enterprises, their ability to achieve social goals while respecting 
financial  constraints,  and  their  significant  impact  on  welfare  systems  and  local 
development. 
 
Social enterprises have recently taken over the heritage of entrepreneurial non-profit 
organizations. They exhibit important potential for the development of new and more 
advanced welfare systems in which the production and delivery of public and quasi-
public goods is decentralised. Further research is needed to support the development 
of more advanced entrepreneurial models for mutual-benefit and public-benefit firms.  
Legislative reforms are also needed in most countries because, for example, to date, 
only a few countries have introduced dedicated legal frameworks for firms undertaking 
public-benefit activities. These reforms are made urgent by the crisis of both financial 
markets and public finance, but social enterprises are among the social actors that 
have  been  least  affected  by  the  crisis  and,  for  this  reason,  have  important 
development potential in the medium and long run. 
 
The  study  has  highlighted  the  strict  interconnection  in  social  enterprises  between 
individual motivations and objectives on the one hand, and organizational goals on the 
other. It has also stressed that external factors play a crucial role in the development 
of these entrepreneurial forms. A first external condition is the evolution of markets 
and welfare systems towards service-led activities, which are often undertaken jointly 
with the delivery of social and personal services. A second external condition consists 
in  the  tighter financial constraints  imposed  by  the  public  actor.  Third,  the  crisis  of 
many  private  firms  opens  up  new  possibilities  for  the  development  of  social 
enterprises in the production of private goods and services.  
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Of course, the limitations of the production abilities of social enterprises should not be 
undervalued.  Social  enterprises  are  often  disadvantaged  in  the  accomplishment  of 
large-scale  production  processes  delivering  standardised  goods  and  services.  They 
also incur more stringent financial constraints. Specialisation of work among different 
types of organizations should ensure that comparative advantages are respected in 
the creation of a new and vital sector of the economy lying in-between the public and 
the  commercial  sectors.  Radical  reforms  of  welfare  systems  have  been  recently 
envisaged  in  many  countries,  most  prominently  the  reform  of  health  care  in  the 
United States and elsewhere. Most reform projects have concerned social enterprises 
to varying degrees in the political arena as well. Given the strong social and political 
implications  of  these  legislative  endeavours,  higher  priority  should  be  given  to  the 
study of these organizational forms. 
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